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The trial of Robert E. Chambers, Jr., for the murder of eighteen-
year-old Jennifer Levin in Central Park in 1986, drew national atten-
tion to a deficiency in our system of expert testimony. The testimo-
nies of the key experts on both sides conflicted on a central factual
question. The jury was confronted with an evidentiary stalemate.'
Evidence cancelling out evidence is merely one of the increasingly
visible problems with partisan expert testimony. At the same time,
expert testimony has become increasingly valuable in several cate-
gories of litigation. It is desirable, then, that the problems associ-
ated with expert testimony be solved not by decreasing its use but
by deemphasizing or supplementing its partisan aspects. This Cur-
rent Topic argues that increased reliance on court-appointed ex-
perts is a useful means of remedying the shortcomings of the
current system.
Presently, judges are reluctant to appoint experts. A notable ob-
stacle to the use of court-appointed experts is a reasonable concern
for the risks of judicial influence on jury deliberation. Other rea-
sons for reluctance include fears of interfering with the traditional
functions of adversarial counsel, fears of creating an inference of a
lack of judicial objectivity that may increase the risk of reversal on
appeal, and unwillingness to devote the time and money necessary
for selecting experts and overseeing the taking of their testimony.
This reluctance necessitates a revision of the system of expert proof-
taking to address these concerns.
1. Dr. Werner Spitz, a witness for the prosecution, testified that circumstantial evi-
dence indicated that the victim had been beaten and then strangled with her blouse by
someone who was facing her. This scenario would provide strong support for a finding
of intent. Dr. Ronald Kornblum, a defense witness, testified that this circumstantial evi-
dence could be explained by the victim's falling to the ground, followed by someone else
applying an arm chokehold from the back. This scenario would be consistent with negli-
gent homicide or other lesser offenses that lacked intent. Johnson, In the Courtroom,
Expertise Is Always a Matter of Opinion, N.Y. Times, Mar. 20, 1988, at E8.
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Rule 706 of the Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE)2 is the most ob-
vious object of reform. Rule 706 codifies the common law right of
courts to appoint experts to testify. It is a response to the view that
the most significant drawback to expert testimony is its current
predominantly partisan presentation. 3 As Rule 706 now stands, it
merely leaves available the judge's common law option to call his or
her own experts. Article VII of FRE does not contain any incentives
to appoint experts. Incentives, however, are necessary to combat
the natural reluctance ofjudges to appoint experts. Thus, Rule 706
is not an adequate response to concerns about the risks of partisan-
ship posed by the current scheme for obtaining expert testimony.
The proposal in this Current Topic recognizes that the first obsta-
cle to judicial appointment of experts, fear of unduly influencing the
jury, is a legitimately-felt one. Legitimate here means in line with
the pursuit of truth, equal access, and efficiency in the adjudication
system. This first concern can, however, be anticipated and ad-
dressed in the reform of Rule 706. The remaining reasons for reluc-
tance to appoint experts are less legitimate. They are bases for
judicial evasion of appointing experts which should be countered
because they persist even when court appointment of experts pro-
motes truth-finding and efficiency. Successful revision of Rule 706
should address both legitimate and illegitimate reasons for reluc-
2. The complete text of Rule 706 states:
(a) Appointment. The court may on its own motion or on the motion of any party
enter an order to show cause why expert witnesses should not be appointed, and
may request the parties to submit nominations. The court may appoint any expert
witnesses agreed upon by the parties, and may appoint witnesses of its own selec-
tion. An expert witness shall not be appointed by the court unless the witness con-
sents to act. A witness so appointed shall be informed of the witness' duties by the
court in writing, a copy of which shall be filed with the clerk, or at a conference in
which the parties shall have opportunity to participate. A witness so appointed shall
advise the parties of the witness' findings, if any; the witness' deposition may be
taken by any party; and the witness may be called to testify by the court or any party.
The witness shall be subject to cross-examination by each party, including a party
calling the witness.
(b) Compensation. Expert witnesses so appointed are entitled to reasonable com-
pensation in whatever sum the court may allow. The compensation thus fixed is
payable from funds which may be provided by law in criminal cases and civil actions
and proceedings involving just compensation under the fifth amendment. In other
civil actions and proceedings the compensation shall be paid by the parties in such
proportion and at such time as the court directs, and thereafter charged in like man-
ner as other costs.
(c) Disclosure of Appointment. In the exercise of its discretion, the court may
authorize disclosure to the jury of the fact that the court appointed the expert
witness.
(d) Parties' Experts Of Own Selection. Nothing in this rule limits the parties in
calling expert witnesses of their own selection. Fed. R. Evid. 706
3. Fed. R. Evid. 706 advisory committee's note (West 1987).
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tance to appoint experts. Rule 706 thus needs the addition of pro-
cedures designed to minimize the aura of enhanced credibility that
judicial appointment may lend an expert witness. At the same time,
revisions should include incentives to overcome the invalid fears
and the tendency toward status quo that inhibit court-appointed ex-
pert testimony when it is a useful supplement to partisan expert
testimony.
I. Deficiencies of Partisan Expert Testimony
The deficiencies of partisan expert testimony divide into two cate-
gories. This division underscores the need for timely revision of
Rule 706 and the present scheme of expert appointment. The first
category includes deficiencies that critics have observed and on
which they have commented for decades. These deficiencies con-
tinue to trouble our system of expert testimony because little has
been done to rectify them. The second category includes deficien-
cies that have recently begun to erode the utility of our system of
expert testimony because they manifest themselves in types of litiga-
tion that are occurring with increasing frequency. Despite the seri-
ousness of these newer deficiencies, legal scholars have not
identified them. Both types of deficiencies call for revision of Rule
706.
A. Longstanding Problems
Discussion of certain problematic aspects of partisan expert testi-
mony is not new. Shortcomings noted by lawyers and scholars for
several decades have tended to fall into one of four categories.
First, some critics point out that if courts rely exclusively on the
parties to produce experts any inequitable distribution of party re-
sources creates an unfair advantage for the side that has the most
money to hire experts. In criminal cases the defendant is generally
at a disadvantage. 4 Naturally, the most respected and accomplished
experts will command the highest fees. Therefore, the litigants with
4. See Alschuler, Mediation With a Mugger: The Shortage of Adjudicative Services
and the Need For A Two-Tier Trial System, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 1808, 1830 (1986). For
statistics on defense lawyers' failure to procure expert witnesses, see H. Kalven & H.
Zeiseil, The American Jury 139 (1966); People v. Chapter, 13 Crim. L. Rptr. (BNA) 2479
(Cal. Super. 1973). See generally Decker, Expert Services in the Defense of Criminal
Cases: The Constitutional and Statutory Rights of Indigents, 51 U. Cin. L. Rev. 574
(1982); Kwall, The Use of Expert Services by Privately Retained Criminal Defense Attor-




greater wealth than their adversaries will be more likely to obtain
persuasive expert testimony, other factors being equal.
A second criticism is of the rise of the "professional" expert.
These are individuals who so frequently offer their services to testify
at trials that they earn a significant portion of their income from
testifying. 5 By 1987, two related predicaments in the hiring of parti-
san experts had become widespread enough to merit the attention
of the Advisory Committee to the drafters of FRE. The Committee
lamented "the practice of shopping for experts" and "the venality of
some experts." 6 Several commentators have noted a resulting low-
ered reputation of experts, which has in turn discouraged many of
the most qualified experts from agreeing to serve as partisan expert
witnesses.
7
A third traditional criticism is the lack of objectivity of partisan
experts. Experts hired by parties tend to function as "hired guns.",
They may either overtly conform their testimony to the needs of the
side that hired them in order to earn a high fee, or they may uncon-
sciously develop a bias favoring their employer's position as a result
of a natural team-spirit mentality. 9
5. See, e.g., "Exploding Bottles-flying caps[:] expert with 20 years worldwide experi-
ence . . . . 100% success to date." Trial, Feb. 1985, at 92 (advertisement by expert
witness for hire); Expert Witnesses: Booming Business for the Specialists, N.Y. Times,
July 5, 1987, at Al (notes examples of ads for experts offering to testify on "bicycle
mishaps, battery or bottle explosions, hot-air balloon accidents, radiation incidents",
and notes emergence of clearinghouses, companies, and thousands of individuals pub-
licizing their availability for providing expert testimony and consultation); Ryan, Making
the Plaintiff's Expert Yours, 24 For The Defense 12, 20 (Nov. 1982); Postel, Income
From Testifying in Other Cases, Chicago Daily L. Bull., Apr. 23, 1987, at 1 (expert
questioned on cross-examination about aggregate income earned from frequently serv-
ing as expert witness).
6. Fed. R. Evid. 706 advisory committee's note, supra note 3, at 306.1. See also Sink,
The Unused Power of a Federal Judge to Call His Own Expert Witness, 29 S. Cal. L.
Rev. 195, 197 (1956) (author notes persistence of "extensive shopping for experts").
7. Van Dusen, A United States District Judge's View of the Impartial Medical Expert
System, 32 F.R.D. 498, 509 (1963) (a state statute providing for court-appointed medical
experts "has the . . . advantage of attracting to the aid of the jury highly qualified medi-
cal experts who otherwise would be unwilling to participate in a legal proceeding in a
position of partisan employment"); Diamond, The Fallacy of the Impartial Expert, 3
Archives of Crim. Psychodynamics 221 (1959), cited in R. Lempert & S. Saltzburg, A
Modern Approach to Evidence 979, 983 (1982) ("dynamically oriented psychotherapists
with liberal, enlightened, and non-moralistic attitudes towards mental illness and crimi-
nal behavior, shamefully avoid their social responsibility to participate in the administra-
tion ofjustice").
8. See Special Issue: The Ethics of Expert Testimony, 10 Law & Human Behav. 1
(1986).
9. See Chambers, Experts Need to Put Their House in Order, 10 Nat'l L.J., Apr. 18,
1988, at 13 (calling professional experts "hired guns"); Van Dusen, supra note 7, at 500
(noting common problem of experts selling out to the highest bidder); Johnson, supra
note 1; Sink, supra note 6, at 209. The problem of the professional expert has plagued
our proof-taking system for at least a century, as the following early criticisms of the
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Inefficiency has been a fourth noticeable deficiency of reliance on
partisan expert testimony. State experiments with systems of court-
appointed medical experts in the 1950s and 1960s elicited comment
on the waste of time and party resources when parties engage in a
"battle of the experts."' 0 Many participants considered these pro-
grams to have enhanced the effectiveness with which malpractice
cases were adjudicated because they cut down on frivolous and irrel-
evant expert testimony and on expert testimony attempting to rebut
frivolous and irrelevant expert claims." Professor Weinstein has
stressed the inefficiency of exclusive use of partisan experts in con-
trast to a system of court-appointed experts.'
2
B. Emerging Dysfunctions
In addition to the longstanding, well-recognized deficiencies of
partisan expert testimony, several emerging shortcomings of expert
testimony are rendering it an even more problematic mode of
proof-taking. The following examination of three of these areas
demonstrates how they undermine the truth-finding, equal access,
and efficiency goals of adjudication to the point where the deficien-
cies represent dysfunctions in the system.
1. Burden of production. Sole reliance on the parties to pro-
duce expert guidance for the court and jury creates a risk of nonpro-
duction of expert evidence. By common law, our adversarial system
has placed the sole burden to produce evidence on the litigants.'
3
problem illustrate. Hand, Historical and Practical Considerations Regarding Expert
Testimony, 15 Harv. L. Rev. 40, 53-56 (1901); Prettyman, Needed, A New Trial Tech-
nique, 34 A.B.A. J. 766 (1948); Elliott & Spellman, Medical Testimony in Personal In-
jury Cases, 2 Law & Contemp. Prob. 466, 473 (1935). This century's greatest scholars of
evidence have criticized the tendency of partisan experts to conform their testimony to
the needs of their clients. E.g., 2 Wigmore, Evidence § 563, at 646 (3d ed. 1940); Mor-
gan, Suggested Remedy for Obstruction to Expert Testimony by Rules of Evidence, 10
U. Chi. L. Rev. 285, 292 (1943); McCormick, Evidence 35 (1954).
10. See, e.g., Van Dusen, supra note 7, at 500-01.
11. See, e.g., Botein, Impartial Medical Testimony, 328 Annals 75 (1960); McNally,
Impartial Medical Testimony Plan-Its Operation and Results, 445 Ins. L.J. 95 (1960);
Niles, Impartial Medical Testimony, 45 Il. B.J. 282 (1957); Peck, A Successful New Plan:
Impartial Medical Testimony, 42 A.B.A. J. 931 (1956); Peck, Impartial Medical Testi-
mony, A Way To Better and Quicker Justice, 22 F.R.D. 21 (1958); Weinrott, The Case
for Impartial Medical Testimony, 21 The Shingle 81 (1958). Under these programs,
state and federal district court judges organized local panels of medical experts from
whom judges could select to investigate individually medical malpractice insurance suits.
The experts' powers varied, but generally they could conduct pre-trial hearings aiming
to reach settlement between claimants and insurance companies.
12. 3 Weinstein & Berger, Weinstein's Evidence 706-11 (1981).
13. See generally R. Lempert & S. Saltzburg, A Modern Approach to Evidence 792-93




The system assumes that opposing counsel, each working to serve
his client's interests, will produce all the relevant evidence needed
to reconstruct the facts. FRE does not explicitly state that the liti-
gants are solely responsible for producing evidence. FRE Rule 301,
the only rule concerned with the burden of production, simply at-
tempts to sort out which party should bear the onus of producing
sufficient evidence on which to base a case decision.'
4
Rule 301 is a shaky basis for compelling the production of expert
evidence. Conceivably, the rule is an attempt to create a tool for the
judge to compel responses from parties, as it is an explanation-
seeker. But the attempt is confused and half-hearted. 15 Even more
problematic, the language of Rule 301 creates the potential for judi-
cial encroachment on the jury's fact-finding function. The rule
leaves the judge as arbiter of whether the burden of production has
been discharged. This judicial power infringes on the jury's prerog-
ative to discredit evidence used at trial because the judge may make
a presumption disappear using evidence that the jury might wholly
discredit.16 Thus, FRE offers no devices with which the court can
compel the parties to produce evidence.
The risk of nonproduction of expert evidence becomes serious in
matters in which courts are dependent on expert guidance for de-
ciding material facts. Four types of litigation are increasingly prone
to dependence on experts for deciding material facts.' 7 First, crimi-
nal cases increasingly rely on forensic expertise to determine the
factual bases of intent and on psychological expertise to determine
the factual bases of insanity.' 8 Second, courts in toxic tort cases are
14. Rule 301 defines the legal effect of evidentiary presumptions in civil actions. It
states that "a presumption imposes . . . the burden of going forward with evidence to
rebut or meet the presumption, but does not shift to such party the burden of proof in
the sense of the risk of nonpersuasion, which remains throughout the trial upon the
party on whom it was originally cast."
15. The language of Rule 301 is vague on the question of burden of production
because the rule relates to the broader burden of proof. The rule leaves unclear
whether or not a presumption imposing the burden of production carries with it the risk
of losing by directed verdict if the burden is not discharged. Also unclarified is the
appropriate standard for determining whether the burden is discharged. It is theoreti-
cally possible that any evidence, no matter how unconvincing, will discharge the burden
of production and shift the presumption. See E. Green & C. Nesson, Problems, Cases
and Materials on Evidence 809-10 (1983).
16. E. Green & C. Nesson, supra note 15, at 811.
17. A material fact is "a fact to which the legal system attaches some consequence."
Zuckerman, Law, Fact or Justice?, 66 B.U.L. Rev. 487, 490 (1986). Material facts are
also referred to as ultimate facts, operative facts, and dispositive facts. Id.
18. See, e.g., Bethea v. United States, 365 A.2d 64, 82 (D.C. 1976), cert. denied, 433
U.S. 911 (1977) ("the witnesses should be free to testify directly in an unrestricted man-
ner concerning all relevant matters to which their competence extends, including their
conclusions as to the existence of a mental impairment and its relationship to the con-
demned behavior."); People v. Drew, 583 P.2d 1318 (Cal. 1978). See generally Bonnie &
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increasingly willing to give a more dispositive role to the testimony
of medical experts.' 9 Third, complex litigation and corporate and
patent cases involving large treble damages awards 20 require deter-
minations of increasingly complex fact situations.2' Differences of
millions and even billions of dollars in a given punitive damages
award depend on fact situations involving sophisticated economic
modeling. Fourth, in child placement cases, professional expertise
is increasingly deemed essential to determining whether or not the
"best interests" standard has been met.
2 2
The Chambers case offers an example of the kind of void that re-
sults from a failure of both parties to produce evidence highly rele-
vant to a material fact. To help the jury determine the existence of
intent to murder the victim, one of the parties' medical experts testi-
fied that the blood vessels in the eyes of the victim had burst, indi-
cating extreme force applied to her neck during strangulation.
After this testimony, the jury asked the judge if an expert could tes-
tify as to the length of the stranglehold that was necessary to burst
the blood vessels. The jury considered that fact relevent to its de-
termination of intent. The prosecution and defense then informed
the judge that neither counsel had asked its experts this question
during deposition, nor had either counsel asked experts to look into
the matter. The parties did not volunteer to direct their experts to
investigate the problem. Instead of appointing an expert on behalf
of the court to investigate and then testify about the relationship
between physical force and the burst blood vessels, the judge simply
informed the jury that no expert opinion would be produced on the
matter.2 3 This kind of evidentiary void, created by the failure of
Slobogin, The Role of Mental Health Professionals in the Criminal Process: The Case
for Informed Speculation, 66 Va. L. Rev. 427 (1980).
19. See, e.g., Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 781 F.2d 394, 413-15 (5th Cir.)
(en banc), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 3339 (1986) (award given for future risk of cancer when
demonstrated by experts to be more than 50%). See generally California Medical Associa-
tion Scientific Board Task Force on Clinical Ecology, Clinical Ecology-A Critical Ap-
praisal, 144 W.J. Med. 239 (1986); Immune System Theories on Trial, 234 Science 1490
(1986).
20. E.g., Polaroid Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co. 789 F.2d 1556 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied,
107 S.Ct. 178 (1986) (damages award pending; interest on damages alone projected
from $1 to $3 billion).
21. See Study To Investigate Use of Scientific Evidence, 7 Nat'l Center for State Cts.
Rep. 1 (Aug. 1980).
22. See infra text accompanying notes 41-45.
23. Johnson, Levin's Injuries Are Described By a Physician, N.Y. Times, Feb. 10,
1988, at B4 (expert testified that "pinpoint hemorrhages" around victim's eyes were
evidence of compression of neck); Johnson, Chambers's Lawyer Challenges Pathologist
About Pressure on Neck, N.Y. Times, Feb. 12, 1988, at B2; Johnson, Expert Disputes
Theory of Levin's Death, N.Y. Times, Mar. 8, 1988, at B2 (expert testified victim's eyes
were not bulging, a classic symptom of extended strangulation); Johnson, End of the




either party to produce a certain piece of expert testimony, strikes at
the heart of the truth-finding goal of our adjudication system.
2. Abuses of discovery. In our age of the mega-sized law firm, it
is increasingly likely that a party represented by such a firm will have
the ability to marshal enough legal resources to intimidate an oppo-
nent during the discovery phase of litigation.2 4 Although judges
sometimes penalize those who commit egregious abuses of discov-
ery,25 production of millions of pages of discovery documents often
goes unchecked.26 This problem undermines the goal of equality of
access to justice because the party with fewer resources than its op-
ponent is left with less time and money to pursue its own argu-
ments, as its counsel is absorbed in responding to its opponent's
interrogatories.
The problem becomes serious when documents relating to expert
opinion constitute a significant bulk of discovery avalanches. This
can be true particularly in complex litigation cases. 27 The phenom-
enon is dysfunctional in two ways. First, the efficiency goal of our
adjudication system is undermined when the motivation to produce
experts is quantity rather than quality. Second, the justice goal of
our system is eroded when party resources influence the ability of
litigants to meet the challenges of their adversaries.
(experts dispute cause of "discolored right eye" of victim and "small hemorrhages
found around the eyelids"); Chambers Jury Deliberates for a Fifth Day, N.Y. Times, Mar.
22, 1988, at B9 ("jurors asked the court for a stipulation from the trial testimony about
the minimum and maximum amount of time that would have been required to cause the
pinpoint hemorrhages found in the lids ofJennifer Levin's eyes"); interview with Profes-
sor Steven Duke, Yale Law School (Mar. 22, 1988).
24. See Note, Discovery Abuse Under the Federal Rules: Causes and Cures, 92 Yale
L.J. 352 (1982).
25. See, e.g., Sig M. Glukstad, Inc. v. Lineas Aereas Nacional--Chile, 656 F.2d 976
(5th Cir. 1981) (dismissal of plaintiff's action); Smith v. Ford Motor Co., 626 F.2d 784
(10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 918 (1981) (reversible error to permit doctor to
testify on matter as to which discovery was obstructed); Carroll v. Abbott Laboratories,
122 Cal. App. 3d 971, 176 Cal. Rptr. 271 (1981), superseded by 654 P.2d 775 (Cal. 1982)
(reversible error to refuse to dismiss for flagrant noncompliance by plaintiff's attorney).
An interview with Judge Jose Cabranes, District of Connecticut (Mar. 20, 1986) con-
firmed the persistence of discovery abuses as a tactic for stalling litigation and intimidat-
ing opponents.
26. See, e.g., Polaroid Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co. 789 F.2d 1556 (each party pro-
duced four to five million pages of discovery documents); Soobzokov v. CBS, 642 F.2d
28 (2d Cir. 1981); International Business Machines Corp. v. United States, 493 F.2d 112
(2d Cir. 1973).
27. E.g., In Re Japanese Electronic Products Antitrust Litigation, 631 F.2d 1069 (3d
Cir. 1980) (multiparty lawsuit requiring jury to sort out opinions--dozens of experts
discussing the facts using complicated economic modeling to explain alternative fact
situations). For confirmation of the increasing dependency on experts of fact-finding in
complex litigation, see Study To Investigate Use of Scientific Evidence, supra note 21.
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3. Evidentiary stalemate. Because the parties to a law suit tend
to shop around for the experts and theories most supportive of their
arguments, it is not uncommon for one expert to contradict another
expert at trial. 28 When the contradiction concerns evidence forming
the basis of a material fact, the resulting evidentiary stalemate cre-
ates a need for some guidance for the jury attempting to weigh the
conflicting experts' opinions.
Again, the Chambers case provides an illustration. Attorneys for
the accused and for the victim both produced forensic experts to
testify about whether or not the markings on Levin's neck were
signs of intentional gripping from the front to strangle-as the pros-
ecution alleged-or signs of accidental grabbing from behind "in a
frantic effort to stop her from squeezing his testicles during a sexual
act"-as the defendant had testified. The prosecution's expert as-
serted that the marks showed a face-to-face encounter. The expert
for the defense claimed the marks were produced from a flailing
grasp from behind. 29
Such evidentiary stalemates can occur in both criminal and civil
cases. The effect on the resolution of the case is similar to that of
the above-discussed failure of partisans to produce evidence highly
probative of material facts-an evidentiary void is created. Eviden-
tiary stalemates become dysfunctional in a truth-seeking adjudica-
tion system when the missing expert testimony is crucial to
determining a material fact. It follows, then, that the problem arises
most frequently in the types of litigation becoming increasingly de-
pendent on expert testimony.
II. The Increasing Value of Expert Testimony and the Need for
Court-Appointed Experts in Four Types of Litigation
Just as partisan expert testimony becomes more problematic, ex-
pertise from disciplines outside the law is becoming more valuable
to litigation. The recent rise in value of expert testimony as a mode
of proof-taking has become particularly apparent in criminal cases
where the determination of intent turns on forensic and psychologi-
cal evidentiary findings, in toxic tort litigation, in complex litigation
cases, and in child placement cases. As shown below, in each of
these four types of litigation, court-appointed experts are a viable
supplement to partisan experts for satisfying the growing depen-
dency of courts on non-legal expertise.
28. See Johnson, supra note 1; Sink, supra note 6, at 197.





The Chambers case mentioned above is a recent example of how
murder cases rely on professional forensic examiners to produce ev-
idence relevant to the issue of intent. Since intent is a material fact
in murder cases, the evidence produced to guide the jury in its de-
termination is crucial to the outcome of the case. Moreover, psychi-
atric expert testimony has assumed an increasingly important role in
determining insanity of criminal defendants. Until 1954, the com-
mon test of insanity was whether the defendant knew the difference
between right and wrong and whether he could resist impulses. 30 It
was a moralistic evaluation, one suited to a jury unaided by scientific
expertise. In 1954, Durham v. United States3' created the rule, largely
in effect today, which gives experts more freedom to express their
views to the jury. As a result, it is more possible for psychiatric ex-
perts to render opinions on mental diseases and defects in terms
which may approach or even amount to the determination of the
legal conclusion of insanity. 3
2
The explosion in the use of polygraphs (lie detectors) in police
departments and government agencies shows nascent signs of a par-
allel growth in the courtroom.3 3 The reliability of polygraphs as
aids to reconstructing facts remains questionable,3 4 yet it is a form
of non-legal expertise intruding on the traditional function of the
jury as evaluator of the credibility of courtroom witnesses.
B. Toxic Torts
Reliance on expert testimony is also significant in cases in other
areas of the law where material facts tend to turn on expert testi-
mony. Tort cases involving medical or chemical disasters increas-
30. This century-old common law rule is called "The M'Naghten Rule." For discus-
sions of how this rule accommodated expert testimony, see A. Goldstein, The Insanity
Defense 53-58 (1967); Livermore & Meehl, The Virtues of M'Naghten, 51 Minn. L. Rev.
789 (1967).
31. 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
32. For cases attempting to curb this expansion of expert determination into the
sphere of the fact finder, see, e.g., McDonald v. United States, 312 F.2d 847, 850-51
(D.C. Cir. 1962); United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
33. Some trial courts have recently admitted expert testimony based on polygraph
results. See, e.g., United States v. Zeiger, 350 F. Supp. 685 (D.D.C.), rev'd, 475 F.2d 1280
(D.C. Cir. 1972). For an indication of the surprisingly widespread open-mindedness of
courts on the question of the accuracy of polygraphs as memory refreshers and confes-
sion inducers, see Commonwealth v. Vitello, 381 N.E.2d 582 (Mass. 1978) (summary of
recent cases involving polygraph results).
34. See Office of Technology Assessment, U.S. Congress, Scientific Validity of Poly-
graph Testing: A Research Review and Evaluation (1983); P. Ekman, Telling Lies 209-
18 (1985).
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ingly call for determinations of causation, negligence, and
contributory negligence, requiring medical testimony.
35
Problems of "hired-gun experts" plague this type of litigation,
perhaps because the potential damages awards are exceptionally
high. Recently, for example, a medical scholar allegedly gave false
information in his testimony on behalf of the maker of the Dalkon
Shield in exchange for $277,000 in fees.3
6
C. Complex Litigation
In the last decade or two, courts trying complex litigation cases
have increasingly relied on expert testimony. 37 The parties produce
these experts. In multiparty litigation, the number of expert wit-
nesses can be staggering, making it difficult for the jury to keep
track of them. Furthermore, calculating damages in patent infringe-
ment cases and resolving questions of misleading financial projec-
tions made by corporate disclosure statements in securities cases
may draw on complicated economic modeling to reconstruct finan-
cial worlds.38 When assessing the guilt and blame of corporations,
courts must look at the probable ramifications in financial and con-
sumer markets of past actions of the corporation.
Regulating the number of experts called in these trials would be a
drastic step for a judge because it involves interfering with the kind
35. J. Weinstein, Role of Expert Testimony and Novel Scientific Evidence in Proof of
Causation, Address Before the ABA Annual Meeting, at 12 (Aug. 9, 1987) (recent obser-
vation of the dispositive authority given to scientific opinion in tort suits). See, e.g., Spill's
Legal Odyssey, N.Y. Times, Oct. 24, 1987, at 10; Handler, Social Dilemmas, Judicial
(Ir)resolutions, 119 NJ. L.J., Mar. 19, 1987, at 5 ("stunning advances in human knowl-
edge, science and technology" have forced courts in toxic tort cases to assume more
responsibility for guiding the evaluation of expert evidence, particularly on issues relat-
ing to causation).
36. Professor is Charged With Lying For Maker of Birth Control Device, N.Y. Times,
Mar. 4, 1988, at 1.
37. Recently, there has been a prevalence of pessimistic scholarly opinion on the
ability of both judges and juries to evaluate massive amounts of expert testimony. Such
commentaries highlight the significance given to expert testimony in complex cases. See,
e.g., Strawn & Munsterman, Helping Juries Handle Complex Cases, 88 Case & Com.,
Mar./Apr. 1983, at 45; Jasanoff & Nelkin, Science, Technology, and the Limits of Judi-
cial Competence, 22JurimetricsJ. 266 (1982); Dombroff, Courts Ill-Equipped to Assess
Scientific Issues, 7 Legal Times,Jan. 7, 1985, at 14. The numerous proposals for reform
to improve courts' ability to evaluate evidence introduced by non-legal experts again
suggest a high frequency of expert testimony in complex cases. See, e.g., Chayes, The
Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1281 (1976); Levi, The
Business of the Courts: A Summary and A Sense of Perspective, 70 F.R.D. 212 (1976);
Hazard & Rice, Judicial Management of the Pretrial Process in Massive Litigation: Spe-
cial Masters as Case Managers, 1982 Am. B. Found. Res. J. 375; Resnik, Managerial
Judges, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 374 (1982).




of case each party can present.3 9 Alternatively, without infringing on
the parties' right to fashion their own cases, the judge can help the
jury sort out the strands of expert opinion by appointing one or
more experts to comment on the partisan expert testimony. Schol-
ars have advocated a variety of proposals to unravel the complexity
of expert input necessary to these cases. None emphasizes in-
creased use of court-appointed experts as a solution.40 All recom-
mend reforms that would change our trial system in more
fundamental-and potentially hazardous-ways. To date, none has
been adopted.
D. Child Placement Cases
Over the last ten years, child placement cases have come to rou-
tinely involve experts from the professions of child psychology, edu-
cation, and social work.4 1 Their involvement is partly the result of
the revolutionizing impact of the "Best Interests of the Child" tril-
ogy on judges and child advocates in child placement cases.
42
39. Judge Weinstein handled the expert witnesses in the Agent Orange case in this
manner. Professor Schuck criticizes this action mainly for its invasion of the domain of
the expert: "[it inescapably amounts to ajudicial second-guessing of scientists' substan-
tive judgments." P. Schuck, Agent Orange on Trial 239 (1986). It seems, however, that
Weinstein did not make a scientific evaluation. Rather, he made a legal evaluation about
the legal effect of scientific testimony. On a summary judgment motion, Weinstein ex-
cluded the plaintiffs' experts on causation by invoking Rules 703 and 403, claiming that
the possibility that the testimony would "mislead and confuse" a jury outweighed its
probative value. Id. at 238. The effect of this exclusion was that Judge Weinstein pre-
vented one of the parties from presenting its case. The movement beyond the tradi-
tional parameters of a judge's authority seems to have been principally a movement, not
across the boundary between science and law, but across the boundary separating the
roles of judge and litigants.
40. E.g., Alschuler, supra note 4, at 1846-54 (judges should more closely supervise
discovery and other pretrial activities guided by safeguards that ensure judicial imparti-
ality); Green, Expanded Use of the Mini-Trial, Private Judging, Neutral-Expert Fact-
Finding, Patent Arbitration and Industry Self-Regulation, in Corporate Dispute Manage-
ment 333, 342 (1982) (use of" 'discovery masters' to assist the court in complex cases
with troublesome discovery disputes"); another proposal attempts to accomodate the
growing need for and use of social science frameworks "for deciding factual issues cru-
cial to the resolution" of cases. Walker & Monahan, Social Frameworks: A New Use Of
Social Science in Law, 73 Va. L. Rev. 559 (1987) (courts should obtain information from
social sciences useful for determination of "factual issues crucial to the resolution of...
specific case[s]," id., "through written briefs and independent investigation .... " Id. at
589; "it is ... the responsibility of the court rather than the jury to evaluate the research
which comprises the social framework." Id. at 594).
41. See Ellis, Evaluating the Expert: Judicial Expectations of Expert Opinion Evi-
dence in Child Placement Adjudications, 5 Cardozo L. Rev. 587 (1984).
42. J. Goldstein, A. Freud, &J. Solnit, Beyond the Best Interests of the Child (new
ed. with epilogue, 1979) [hereinafter Beyond the Best Interests]; J. Goldstein, A. Freud,
&J. Solnit, Before the Best Interests of the Child (1979) [hereinafter Before the Best
Interests]; J. Goldstein, J. Solnit, A. Freud, & M. Goldstein, In the Best Interests of the
Child (1986) [hereinafter In the Best Interests]. For a convincing discussion of the tril-
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These books recommend strict limitation of the judicial function to
legal matters and heavy input by child care professionals on non-
legal matters affecting the placement of the child. 43 In addition,
judges in child placement cases are particularly receptive to expert
opinions because the trial judge has unusually wide discretion and
almost no legal guidelines.
44
Normally, the court directly or indirectly appoints experts in these
cases. Social workers at the court's family relations department in-
terview all the family members involved. Upon their recommenda-
tion of a full psychiatric evaluation of a family member, the court
will issue a court order appointing a psychiatrist. Usually the court
selects an expert agreed upon by the parties. When parties cannot
agree, the court selects. In some states, Connecticut for example,
judges appoint an advocate for the child and the advocate then
chooses the experts. Partly because these cases do not always in-
volve two clearly demarcated adversaries, even experts hired by the
litigants' attorneys tend to become part of a team to which all expert
members contribute their opinions on matters within the areas of
their expertise. The ultimate function of the team is to advise the
judge.
45
E. Advantages of Court-Appointed Experts as Supplement
to Partisan Experts
Because the role of the expert bears ever more heavily upon the
outcome of these four types of cases, the deficiencies of partisan ex-
pert testimony--expert biases, failure to produce adequate expert
testimony, inequities in party resources, and evidentiary stale-
mates-pose significant threats to the truth-finding and justice goals
of our system of adjudication. Increased use of non-partisan experts
ogy's influence in child placement decision making, see Davis, "There is a Book
Out . . .": An Analysis of Judicial Absorption of Legislative Facts, 100 Harv. L. Rev.
1539, 1546, 1569 (1987) (Beyond the Best Interests was cited in 193 court cases. In
most adoption cases after Beyond the Best Interests was published, expert evidence is
frequently given both supporting and contradicting the "psychological parent theory"
espoused in Beyond the Best Interests).
43. See In The Best Interests, supra note 42, at 48-49, 58, 68, 159 n.6, 164 n.l 1, 172-
73 n.35, 177-78 n.10, 186 n.22, 190 n.24; Beyond The Best Interests, supra note 42, at
86-96; Before The Best Interests, supra note 42, at 122, 226 n.8, 228-31 & n.13.
44. Note, Lawyering for the Child: Principles of Representation in Custody and Vis-
itation Disputes Arising from Divorce, 87 Yale LJ. 1126, 1135-36 (1978).
45. Wald, Book Review, The Kindness of Strangers, 97 Yale L.J. (forthcoming is-
sue 7) (1988); interview with Miriam Berkman, Supervising Attorney, Jerome N. Frank




would decrease the problems inherent in expert testimony without
detracting from its value.
Non-partisan experts are less susceptible to pressures to tailor
their testimony to support a particular legal outcome than are parti-
san experts whose fees are paid by parties interested in the legal
outcome. Ascertaining when there is a failure of production, an
abuse of a party's financial advantage, or an evidentiary stalemate
will, of course, be difficult in some situations. But it is not an insur-
mountable difficulty. Much of the difficulty stems from judges' lack
of familiarity with the scientific theories in question. A judge is not
likely to be an expert in the field in which the expert is testifying. A
judge is supposed to be a legal expert, however, and determining
the adequacy of expert testimony for the purpose of arriving at a
legal resolution is a job with which we expect judges to be familiar
and at which they should be competent. Evaluations of legal issues
may be complicated, but we have vested in our judges the authority
and responsibility to make these evaluations. Also, a judge and jury
are better situated than are parties' attorneys to notice when the tes-
timony of one party's expert cancels out the testimony of another
and leaves an information gap that needs to be filled. The judge is
in a better position than is the jury to do. something about filling
such gaps. The judge is the only player in a stymied litigation able
to select and produce an expert who can offer a new view not pro-
vided by the parties' experts or provide enough additional support
for one of the views provided by the partisan experts to break the
stalemate.
Reaching a decision to appoint an expert is the first stage of the
appointment process. The court most likely will be able to obtain
all its cues from either a thorough reading of the briefs before trial
or from close observation of expert testimony as the trial
progresses.
Once a court decides to appoint an expert to remedy any of the
situations outlined above, the appointment process would be
roughly the same for all of them. The court would marshal its re-
sources to investigate the general area of expertise that is posing a
problem to the present litigation. It then will determine which ex-
pert or experts are most appropriate for appointment. Local psy-
chologists or social workers should be adequate for most criminal
insanity defenses, while nationally prominant leaders in a field may
be required for large-scale, complex litigation. Naturally, the court
would save time if it could rely on pre-assembled lists of experts
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approved and available for specified types of issues,4 6 though cau-
tion would be advised for maintaining a professional distance be-
tween these experts and the court.4 7 The court may also wish to
select experts based on submissions of written evaluations of the
problem.
Once the court selects the expert, it is within the court's authority
to call the expert to testify at trial and to initiate questioning of the
expert by the judge.48 Of course, to avoid confrontation clause
problems, counsel for both or all parties would be entitled to ques-
tion and cross-examine the expert.
Costs would be assigned according to the broad specifications of
Section 706(b), which leaves to the judge's discretion the determi-
nation of an equitable apportionment of the costs between the par-
ties. The only requirement is that the court underwrite the costs in
fifth amendment compensation cases. 49 It may be sensible in many
civil disputes to assign the costs of hiring the expert to the losing
party. 5
0
III. Judges' Reluctance to Appoint Experts and the
Need to Amend Rule 706
Court-appointed experts will not be used in most cases where
they are needed if FRE Rule 706 is not amended. Even with Rule
46. See generally Wick & Kightlinger, Impartial Medical Testimony Under the Federal
Civil Rules: A Tale of Three Doctors, 34 Ins. Couns. J. 115, 118 (1967) (description of
five individual federal district courts that experimented with a system drawing on local
medical advisory boards for court-appointed experts in insurance cases and established
local rules giving the court power to initiate the process).
47. For a proposal that would not work in most of the situations outlined in this
Current Topic, see Levy, Impartial Medical Testimony-Revisited, 34 Temp. L.Q. 416,
423 (1961) ("doctors are assigned under a rotating system which introduces an element
of chance into the situation"). This Current Topic targets four very different types of
litigation for increased use of court-appointed experts. In order for courts to select
their experts at random in these four types of suits, a rotating panel would have to be
established for each area of litigation. This would be difficult for complex litigation and
toxic torts because the types of expertise required vary greatly from lawsuit to lawsuit.
Also, because of the higher financial stakes and more refined areas of specialty involved,
panels for complex litigation and toxic torts would have to draw from a national base,
while most criminal and child placement cases using psychiatrists and doctors could use
a local pool of experts. The cost of hiring from national panels would be considerable.
48. For recognition of the courts' power to initiate the calling of expert witnesses at
trial, see 9 Wigmore, Evidence § 2484 (3d ed. 1940). For previous proposals and argu-
ments that courts have the authority to call and question their own witnesses pursuant to
local rules, see Van Dusen, supra note 7, at 503, 516-20.
49. See Fed. R. Evid. 706(b), supra note 2, and advisory committee's note, supra
note 3.
50. For refined variations of this suggestion, see Van Dusen, supra note 7, at 503,




706 in place, judges rarely appoint experts. 5 1 The reasons for their
reluctance are not clearly documented. No studies have investi-
gated judicial behavior when confronted with the possibility of ap-
pointing experts. 52 Thus, the following are common sense,
theoretical explanations.
A. Undue Judicial Influence
One obstacle to the use of court-appointed experts is judges' rea-
sonable concern with the risks of judicial influence on jury delibera-
tion. 53 Judges and scholars have referred to this problem with
varying degrees of emphasis on the danger it poses for use of court-
appointed experts. Those who raise this concern as an insurmount-
able obstacle to the use of court-appointed witnesses exaggerate its
importance, claiming that it poses a threat to the seventh amend-
ment guarantee of a jury trial. 54 This argument rests on the as-
sumption that juries will be unduly persuaded by a court-appointed
expert and unduly unaffected by the opinions of experts hired by
the parties. 55 There is no conclusive, empirical evidence that juries
are necessarily misled into giving court-appointed expert testimony
51. See E. Green & C. Nesson, supra note 15, at 699.
52. Louis Harris and Associates conducted a poll on "Judicial Attitudes Toward Is-
sues in Civil Procedure" from October to December 1987. The poll surveyed the atti-
tudes of federal and state judges toward proposed changes increasing the "use of expert
witnesses in addition to adversary witnesses who are independent of the parties to the
trial." Louis Harris and Associates, Inc., Study No. 874017, 52-53 (Apr. 1988) (survey
conducted for Aetna Life & Casualty). An overwhelming majority of both federal (76%)
and state (70%) judges replied that they favor increased use of non-adversarial experts.
Id. The survey is useful to this proposal because a preponderance ofjudicial support for
an attempt to increase the use of court-appointed experts underscores the feasibility of
such a reform attempt. The survey does not, however, gauge judicial attitudes when
specifically faced with the possibility or the necessity of appointing expert witnesses.
Thus, the survey does not aid this proposal in assessing the sources of judicial reluc-
tance to appoint experts.
Two limited surveys in the 1960s attempted to gauge judges' and lawyers' attitudes
toward medical experts appointed by courts as a part of the local experiments with sys-
tems of rotating expert panels for medical malpractice cases. One surveyed 300 judges,
lawyers and doctors in Nebraska in 1965, most of whom favored the use of such experts.
See Myers, "The Battle of the Experts": A New Approach to an Old Problem in Medical
Testimony, 44 Neb. L. Rev. 539, 540 (1965). The other surveyed 99 judges nationwide
in 1966, and most disapproved of the use of such experts. See Wick & Kightlinger, supra
note 46, at 120. Neither survey examined the behavior of judges when faced with an
opportunity to appoint experts or of appellate courts reviewing cases involving court-
appointed experts, nor is either survey recent enough to be of use to this proposal.
53. See Chambers, supra note 9 ("some judges also are reluctant to allow expert testi-
mony for fear it will overwhelm the jury and make the expert, in effect, the ultimate
factfinder").
54. See, e.g., Saltzburg, The Unnecessarily Expanding Role of the American Trial
Judge, 64 Va. L. Rev. 1, 78 (1978); Levy, supra note 47, at 424.
55. For an example of this assumption by a critic of court-appointed experts, see,
e.g., Saltzburg, supra note 54, at 77-78.
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undue weight in their consideration of evidence. Admittedly, there
is always a risk of juries being prejudiced by any kind of evidence.
FRE 40356 supersedes Rule 706, however, serving to minimize at all
times the possibility of prejudicial information and of undue influ-
ence from both lay and expert testimony and from both real and
demonstrative evidence. 57 In addition, most case law on the subject
supports the right of courts to appoint witnesses over any possible
threat that right poses to a defendant's right to a jury trial. 58 A final
and most powerful argument that Rule 706 poses no threat to the
seventh amendment is that judges are not empowered to delegate
any aspect of the jury's fact-finding function to an expert. For all
these reasons, court-appointed experts do not now pose a trouble-
some threat to the seventh amendment.
B. Interference With Adversarial Counsel
Another reason for judges' reluctance to appoint experts is the
fear of interfering with the traditional functions of adversarial coun-
sel. Reflections of this fear in scholarly writings often take the form
of a discussion of the "active" versus the "passive" judge. 59 Such
discussions often confuse "active" with interfering and "passive"
with indifferent, instead of clearly defining these words so as to free
them of some of the baggage associated with the adversarial myth.
Disinterested need not mean indifferent and uninvolved. 60 This no-
tion is based on a clinging to the myth that our legal system is "ad-
versarial," and the more purely adversarial the better. Legal
historians agree that the Anglo-American trial system has, since the
late nineteenth century, been moving closer to the so-called "inquis-
itorial" systems of countries on the European Continent. 6' For ex-
56. "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substan-
tially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or mislead-
ing the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation
of cumulative evidence." Fed. R. Evid. 403.
57. For a discussion of the distinction between real and demonstrative evidence, see
R. Lempert & S. Saltzburg, supra note 7, at 988-91.
58. For caselaw support, see Wick & Kightlinger, supra note 46, at 130-31. For con-
firmation that the "inherent power of a trial judge to appoint an expert of his own chos-
ing is virtually unquestioned," see advisory committee's note, supra note 3, at 106. See
also Sink, supra note 6; Van Dusen, supra note 7, at 514-15; 9 Wigmore, Evidence § 2484
(3rd ed. 1940).
59. See Saltzburg, supra note 54, at 74-81.
60. Sink, supra note 6, at 214.
61. See Merryman, On the Convergence (and Divergence) of the Civil Law and the
Common Law, 17 Stan. J. Int'l Stud. 357 (1981). See also Langbein, The German Advan-
tage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. 823, 840 (1986) ("In the use of expertise
German civil procedure strikes an adroit balance between nonadversarial and adver-




ample, the practices of plea bargaining and bench trials are non-
jury-trial devices representing aberrations of the adversarial quality
of our legal system. 62 They are litigation shortcuts which enhance
the discretion and power of the judge and abort due process safe-
guards in order to avoid the high costs of jury trials. Similarly, the
use of court-appointed experts may be viewed as a deviation from
the adversarial nature of a trial employed in order to further the
truth-seeking goal of the system.
C. Problems of Judicial Objectivity
A third fear is that of creating an inference of a lack of judicial
objectivity. Of course, judges should always vigilantly maintain
their objectivity. As will become clear upon distinguishing concerns
about the appearance of objectivity from concerns about actually be-
ing objective, this fear is both exaggerated and misplaced with re-
gard to court-appointed experts. First, this concern exaggerates the
threat to the appearance of judicial objectivity posed by court-ap-
pointed experts. If two opposing litigants produce conflicting ex-
pert testimony, perhaps because the two experts fall on opposite
ends of a spectrum of accepted scientific theory, the testimony of
the court-appointed expert will often support one party's expert to
the detriment of the other. The fact that the testimony does not
come out half-way between them is not itself proof that the judge is
biased. Legal bias is to be avoided, but scientific bias-the favoring
of one scientific theory over another-is possible, even inevitable at
times, in order for the judge to remain impartial. Also, in some
cases there is a viable midpoint on the spectrum between the par-
ties' experts or a third separate theory that the court-appointed ex-
pert may use as a basis for his or her testimony. The expert can be
useful simply by putting partisan expert views into perspective.
Even if the court's expert must conclude that he is unable to make
any findings based on the current state of scientific expertise in his
field, this conclusion of itself has an affirmative value for the trier of
ish scholar noted the need for increased court appointment of experts in Britain. See
Basten, The Court Expert in Civil Trials, 40 Mod. L. Rev. 174 (1977).
62. See Langbein, Mixed Court and Jury Court: Could the Continental Alternative
Fill the American Need?, 1981 Am. B. Found. Res. J. 195, 197.
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fact.63 But in these latter cases, the appearance of the judge's objec-
tivity is in no danger.64
Likewise, judges' fear of actually losing their impartiality by ap-
pointing experts is misplaced. It is based on a confused understand-
ing of the definition of impartiality. Of concern to some critics is the
fact that there is no such thing as "impartial" expert testimony be-
cause no science is exact and there will always be a difference of
opinion among experts within a given field. 6 5 The point, however,
is that court-appointed experts be neutral in a legal sense, not in a
scientific sense. In fact, non-partisan experts are freer from pressure
toward legal bias than are partisan experts because the people pay-
ing the non-partisan experts' fees have no personal interest in the
outcome of the case. All the judge needs to do is avoid pressuring
the appointed experts to testify a certain way and avoid deliberately
appointing a witness for the purpose of influencing the jury.
The specter of appellate level review may explain the widespread
reluctance of judges to risk creating an inference of a lack of objec-
tivity by appointing experts. There is no empirical evidence that
trial court decisions tend to be overturned on appeal because of, or
even incidental to, the appointment of experts. In the absence of
systematic, statistical information we must turn to an individual
case. Judges might take comfort in the events of the "Agent Or-
ange" case as a famous example ofjudicial participation in the pro-
duction of expert testimony. Although Judge Weinstein's exclusion
of some partisan expert testifiers in that case represents a somewhat
63. See Van Dusen, supra note 7, at 511 n.15.
Courts have unwittingly been swayed by partisan testimony of people fraudulently
masquerading as experts. Such situations warn of the dangers to truth-seeking of
uninvolved and uninformed judges. One remedy is a court-appointed expert to testify
on the validity of the partisan expert's expertise as a "field" under FRE 703 (the "Frye"
rule). As an example of this problem, one expert witness falsely claimed that an exper-
tise in dog-sniffing techniques existed as a device for identifying suspects and was used
successfully to convict defendants in several cases. In two of the cases, defendants did
not call their own experts to contradict this expert. United States v. Gates, 680 F.2d
1117 (6th Cir. 1982); Epperly v. Commonwealth, 294 S.E.2d 882 (Va. 1982). In another
case, defendant called an opposing expert to contradict this same expert, but the court
was persuaded by this expert and defendant was convicted. State v. Roscoe, No. 90-345,
slip op. (Ariz. Dec. 28, 1984).
64. For a discussion of the tangential and virtually groundless obstacle to courts ap-
pointing experts, that of the risk of the expert's partiality, see Diamond, supra note 7
(court-appointed experts tend to devote less time to the job and take job less seriously
than do parties' experts; author offers his "editorial opinion" that court-appointed ex-
perts are biased in favor of the prosecution, but offers no support for this notion). For a
practitioner-oriented article that touches on the problem of impartiality in expert testi-
mony, see Thorner, Effective Use of Independent Medical Exams, 24 For the Defense 21
(Jan. 1982).




drastic affront to the adversarial nature of our legal system, his deci-
sion was not overturned on appeal.6
6
D. Lack of Judicial Resources
A fourth basis for judicial reluctance to appoint experts is sheer
unwillingness to devote the time and money necessary for selecting
experts and overseeing the taking of their testimony. Appointing ex-
perts requires a thorough understanding of the case and research
into the relevant fields of expertise. A shortcoming of an adversarial
system of litigation is the tendency of judges not to follow closely
the briefs or the proceedings of a case. The duty of noninvolvement
becomes for judges an excuse for not doing their homework and for
allocating their time to other judicial tasks that appear more press-
ing.6 7 This unwillingness might also be described as a product of
bureaucratic mentality-in a bureaucracy it is always safer to do
nothing than to stick your neck out. This brand of passivity in all its
manifestations stands in the way of the truth-seeking goal of our
adjudication system. Effective reform of Rule 706 should include
disincentives to this tendency.
IV Proposal for Reform of Rule 706
Since FRE Rule 706 is the sole codification of the common law
power of courts to appoint experts, it is the most obvious object of
reform in the attempt to modify judicial behavior in the appointing
of experts. Rule 706 is the surest place from which to send the ap-
propriate signals to the judiciary.
Rule 706 codifies the common law right of courts to appoint ex-
perts to testify. It is a response to the view that the most significant
drawback to expert testimony is its current, predominantly partisan
66. See P. Schuck, supra note 39. An older case is more on point-an appellate court
did not overturn a trial court's decision challenged on the ground that it had exceeded
its powers by calling a handwriting expert. Kamahalo v. Coelho, 24 Haw. 689, 694-95
(1919).
67. See Langbein, The German Advantage, supra note 61, at 841 (discussing "simple
inertia" as one explanation for judges' behavior). The author's interviews have sug-
gested laziness as a possible reason for judicial unwillingness to undertake the responsi-
bility and extra research necessary to appoint experts for the court. Interview with
Professor Stephen Duke, Yale Law School (Mar. 22, 1988); interview with Dan
Saulewicz, free lance reporter and former consultant to "20/20," Yale Law School (Apr.
1, 1988). See also Discretion and Justice Leff, N.Y. Times, Sept. 2, 1982, at A26 (men-
tions "lazy" and "slow" judges in New York's judicial system); Haberman, Koch Judges
Judges and They Return the Favor, N.Y. Times, Nov. 23, 1980, at E6 (Koch criticizes
New York judges for being too passive in criminal cases; suggests "judges confuse insu-
larity with independence").
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presentation. 68 As Rule 706 now stands, it merely leaves available
the judge's common law option to call his or her own experts. Arti-
cle VII of FRE does not contain any incentives to appoint experts.
Incentives are necessary to combat the natural reluctance ofjudges
to appoint experts. Rule 706 is therefore not an adequate response
to the concerns about the risks of partisanship posed by the current
scheme of court reliance on parties to obtain expert testimony in
court. Because increased use of non-partisan experts would de-
crease the problems inherent in expert testimony without detracting
from its value, Rule 706 should be amended to make court appoint-
ment of experts a more attractive alternative to deferring to the dis-
cretion of adversaries.
In order to recognize the legitimacy of the fear of unduly influenc-
ing the jury, a requirement for ajury instruction should be incorpo-
rated into Rule 706 in the form of an addition to Section 706(c).
The new provision should come at the end of the existing language,
and should read: "Upon disclosure that it appointed the expert wit-
ness, the court has a duty to instruct the jury that the jury is to make
the final decision on issues of fact and is not bound to accept as true
the testimony of the expert solely because the court selected him or
her, but rather, the jury is to judge the testimony according to the
same standard as the testimony of the other expert witnesses." This
revision is designed to minimize the aura of extra credibility that
judicial appointment may lend an expert witness.
In order to combat the tendency toward safe and easy inactivity
inhibiting the court appointment of experts even when it is a useful
supplement to partisan expert testimony, a new provision should be
added to Rule 706 in the form of a Section 706(e). The new provi-
sion should read as follows: "(e). When Not Discretionary. Courts
have an affirmative duty to appoint their own witnesses when the
fact-finding process will otherwise be severely impaired. Such situa-
tions include those in which partisan expertise fails to produce
highly relevant evidence; in which partisan expertise conflicts on a
material fact, leaving a lack of guidance for the jury determination;
or in which the production of partisan expert testimony is abused."
This revision is not to be interpreted to mean that courts should
always appoint expert witnesses. Rather, it is meant to call judges'
attention to the need to appoint experts in cases where partisan ex-
pertise fails. To this end, an advisory committee note should follow
this new section of the rule: "Failure by the court to identify situa-




tions in which an expert witness should be appointed will be
grounds for appellate review and assignment of reversible error."
Admittedly it is difficult for a judge to decide which expert to call.
The judge could get parties to agree on an expert. The danger
here, however, is that in the judge's attempt to appear impartial, the
choice may be a conciliatory witness, one whose views are not
clearly defined or rigorous. While a pacifying personality is fine for
selecting an arbitrator to achieve a compromise between two dispu-
tants, it is not a good indicium of an expert highly respected in his
field. Therefore, an alteration of the Rule 706(a) appointment
clause is in order. It should be changed from "The court may ap-
point any expert witnesses agreed upon by the parties, and may ap-
point expert witnesses of its own selection" to "The court may
appoint expert witnesses of its own selection, with or without the
consent of the parties, and with or without the assistance of the par-
ties. The Court may initiate the appointment, calling, and question-
ing of the expert." This language reinforces the point that the
judge's authority to decide when and whom to appoint is independ-
ent from the parties' prerogative to do so. The language clarifies
the judge's affirmative duty to appoint experts in some situations
even over the objection of the parties. Moreover, the language also
clarifies that the aim of calling court-appointed experts is not solely
to effect a settlement between the parties, but also to facilitate truth-
finding in situations in which the judge deems the parties have failed
to do so.
6 9
69. Thus, Rule 706, amended pursuant to this proposal, reads as follows:
706(a) Appointment. The court may on its own motion or on the motion of any
party enter an order to show cause why expert witnesses should not be appointed,
and may request the parties to submit nominations. The court may appoint expert
witnesses of its own selection, with or without the consent of the parties, and with or
without the assistance of the parties. The court may initiate the appointment, call-
ing, and questioning of the expert. An expert witness shall not be appointed by the
court unless the witness consents to act. A witness so appointed shall be informed
of the witness' duties by the court in writing, a copy of which shall be filed with the
clerk, or at a conference in which the parties shall have opportunity to participate.
A witness so appointed shall advise the parties of the witness' findings, if any; the
witness' deposition may be taken by any party; and the witness may be called to
testify by the court or any party. The witness shall be subject to cross-examination
by each party, including a party calling the witness.
(b) Compensation. Expert witnesses so appointed are entitled to reasonable
compensation in whatever sum the court may allow. The compensation thus fixed is
payable from funds which may be provided by law in criminal cases and civil actions
and proceedings involving just compensation under the fifth amendment. In other
civil actions and proceedings the compensation shall be paid by the parties in such
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V Conclusion
This Current Topic proposal aids the truth-seeking, equal access,
and efficiency goals of our adjudication system by helping to correct
the dysfunctions currently emerging in our system's virtually sole
reliance on partisan expert testimony. Proposed Section 706(e) alle-
viates the most serious risks of nonproduction of evidence and evi-
dentiary stalemate which undermine the truth-seeking function in
cases where a legal decision turns on expert testimony. The amend-
ment of Section 706(a), by disabusing judges of the notion that they
must reconcile parties' demands when appointing experts, helps
identify court-appointed witnesses as a tool for enhancing efficiency,
even when this conflicts with the parties' desires. The court-ap-
pointed expert's functions include serving as a sanction against par-
ties who hire excessive numbers of experts or produce excessive
expert-generated documentation during discovery. By alerting
courts to an affirmative duty to recognize situations in which their
own experts can alleviate abuse of evidence production by the par-
ties, Section 706(e) combats problems of the lack of equal access
posed by the dysfunctions of discovery abuse and the inability of
some parties to afford to obtain adequate expert testimony. Section
706(a) promotes efficiency because it notifies courts that appointing
experts may be a tool for handling cases without striving for
settlement.
The revision of Section 706(c) suggested in this Current Topic
introduces ways of alleviating the legitimate concern of judges that
they not unduly influence the jury. Section 706(c) requires a jury
instruction that cautions against treating the court-appointed testi-
proportion and at such time as the court directs, and thereafter charged in like man-
ner as other costs.
(c) Disclosure of Appointment. In the exercise of its discretion, the court may
authorize disclosure to the jury of the fact that the court appointed the expert wit-
ness. Upon disclosure that it appointed the expert witness, the court has a duty to
instruct the jury that the jury is to make the final decision on issues of fact and is not
bound to accept as true the testimony of the expert solely because the court se-
lected him or her, but rather, the jury is to judge the testimony according to the
same standard as the testimony of the other expert witnesses.
(d) Parties' experts of own selection. Nothing in this rule limits the parties in
calling expert witnesses of their own selection.
(e) When Not Discretionary. Courts have an affirmative duty to appoint their
own witnesses when the fact-finding process will otherwise be severely impaired.
Such situations include those in which partisan expertise fails to produce highly
relevant evidence; in which partisan expertise conflicts on a material fact, leaving a
lack of guidance for the jury determination; or in which the production of partisan




mony as necessarily more accurate than that produced by the
parties.
In addition, all three provisions of this proposal aim to leave little
leeway for accommodating the unreasonable bases for judicial reluc-
tance to appoint experts. Section 706(a) refuses to accept the con-
tention that contradiction of the parties' wishes about the court
appointing experts is undue interference with the adversarial pro-
cess. Nowhere, however, does this proposal encourage the extra in-
terference that is brought by judicial revision of the parties' cases.
Section 706(e), by stressing the affirmative duty to appoint when sit-
uations call for it, refuses to accommodate judges' tendency toward
inactivity. Section 706(a)'s attention to the appearance of objectiv-
ity shows that courts may appoint experts without being perceived
as losing objectivity. Creating an affirmative duty in Section 706(e)
goes further and signals that in some situations failing to appoint
experts will arouse suspicion about the court's indifference. Thus,
an amended Rule 706 can recognize that judicial indifference joins
judicial partiality as a violation of the judicial role.
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